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Health Care in Crisis: The Need for Medical Liability
Reform
DonaldJ. Palmisano, M.D., J.D.*
Health care in the United States is currently in a state of crisis, and the
need for reform is significant. The American Medical Association (AMA)
was established in 1847 in large part to help safeguard and improve
medical care and patient safety.1 Unfortunately, 150 years later, the health
care system is seriously jeopardized by the detrimental effects of this
nation's broken medical liability system.
Indeed, medical negligence lawsuits are as old as the AMA. At the
same time the AMA was taking shape, pioneering physicians were
discovering new treatments for previously untreatable conditions-for
example, doctors developed methods to heal compound fractures that did
not require amputation. Yet these advancements produced a surprising
result: Trial lawyers began using the example of "a limb [that] had healed
to a shortened, deformed, or frozen position" as the basis for medical
negligence lawsuits.3 As a result of these lawsuits, "some of the best
physicians in the country stopped taking such cases.,,4
Today, lawsuits against skilled physicians are yielding largely the same
result: Experienced obstetricians no longer deliver babies; highly-trained
neurosurgeons no longer perform life-saving brain and trauma surgery;
and orthopedic surgeons no longer perform complex procedures.
5
Ironically, as physicians grow increasingly skilled at treating the most
complex conditions, personal injury lawyers target those same high-risk
specialists.6 Indeed, the AMA has found that the number of U.S. states with
* Immediate Past President, American Medical Association.
1. AM. MED. ASS'N, CARING FOR THE COUNTRY 14-15 (1997).




5. Am. Med. Ass'n, America's Medical Liability Crisis: A National View (2004), at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871 .html.
6. Mohr, supra note 2.
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"crisis" situations has increased from twelve to twenty since it began its
most recent national medical liability crisis in 2002.'
The developments prompting the AMA's concerns have not gone
unnoticed, and the resulting policy debates have been contentious. Several
state legislatures have gone into extra sessions to try to resolve the crisis.8 In
Congress, the fight to address the medical liability crisis has been
particularly divisive: The House of Representatives has passed medical
liability reforms multiple times," but none has passed the Senate.
The bitterness of this dispute can be traced to personal injury lawyers'
desire to maintain the status quo of a civil justice system where multi-
million dollar jury awards benefit a very few, but have negative ripple
effects that affect many. The average jury award in 2002 reached $6.2
million in medical negligence cases.' ° Between 1996 and 2002, the average
liability judgment increased 234%, and by 2001-2002, fifty-two percent of
7. Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 5. Those twenty states are Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. As a result, the AMA has made medical liability reform its top
legislative priority. Id. In determining whether a state is "in crisis," "showing problem signs,"
or "currently okay," id., the AMA considers a wide variety of factors and available sources.
The primary factor in the AMA analysis is the degree to which patients have lost access to
medical care. For example, the AMA is concerned with newspaper and other anecdotal
reports showing that a growing number of physicians no longer provide crucial medical
services such as delivering babies and providing trauma care. The AMA also considers each
state's legislative, legal, and judicial climates; the affordability and availability of
professional liability insurance; and the trends of jury awards and settlements. Other factors
include the frequency and severity of lawsuits, the quality and presence of a state's medical
liability laws, and the likelihood of reforms being enacted and/or constitutionally upheld.
See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, Statement for the Record of the American Medical Association to
the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee and the Senate Judiciary
Committee RE: Patient Access Crisis: The Role of Medical Litigation (Feb. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Am. Med. Ass'n Statement], http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/1 2990.html.
8. See, e.g., Steve Stanek, Illinois Legislature Fails Again at Tort Reform, HEALTH CARE NEWS
(Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=15515.
9. See HEALTH Act of 2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004); Pregnancy and Trauma
Care Access Protection Act of 2004, S. 2207, 108th Cong. (2004); Healthy Mothers and
Healthy Babies Access to Care Act of 2003, S.2061, 108th Cong. (2003); Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong.
(2003); Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003).
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all awards for medical negligence cases were for one million dollars or
more." Physicians and patients seek reform because these excesses have
caused significant disruption and skyrocketing costs to the health care
system.
This Case Study argues that California's Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA) of 19752 is a model of the type of reform needed to
guide deliberations and action in Congress and in the states without
reform.
I. HEALTH CARE IN CRISIS
In medicine, it is necessary to diagnose the problem before one can
correctly treat the patient; the same holds true in the medical liability
reform debate. When people think about the medical liability crisis, they
may think first of the staggering jury verdicts leveled against defendant
physicians.' 3 Indeed, current trends in jury awards illustrate why the
medical liability crisis has taken such deep hold: The median medical
liability award in medical liability cases jumped 114% from 1996 to 2002,
topping one million dollars.
4
It is also important to note the significant costs that trials inflict on
physicians, even when they are not found liable, as is often the case. Nearly
seventy percent of medical liability claims in 2002 were closed without
payment to the plaintiff.'5 In fact, plaintiffs lost the majority of their cases
that went to a jury: Of the 4.9% of claims decided by jury verdict, the
defendant won 82.4% of the time.' 6 However, physicians who prevail at trial
still have large fees-on average, more than $77,000 per claim-to pay for
their defenses. 7 Yet, as significant as these costs are, the most dramatic
consequences of the medical liability crisis are not the direct effects on
physicians, but the indirect effects on patients and the health care system
as a whole.
11. Id. at 18, 43.
12. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975, chs. 1-2, 1975 Cal. Stat.
2d Ex. Sess. 3949.
13. E.g., Walter Olsen, Curing Health Care; Delivering Justice, WALL ST.J., Feb. 27, 2003, at
A12 ("Most juries, it seems, decide such [medical negligence] cases in favor of the defense.
But those that find for the plaintiff return awards that not infrequently top $10 million.").
14. JURYVERDICT RESEARCH, supra note 10, at 18.
15. PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., PIAA CLAIM TREND ANALYSIS exhibits 1-2 (2003).
16. Id. exhibits 1-2, 6a.
17. Id. exhibits 6a-4. In cases where the claim was dropped or dismissed, costs to
defendants averaged almost $16,307. Id. exhibits 6b-4.
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The importance of these indirect effects is reflected in the criteria that
the AMA uses to determine whether a state is in a "state of crisis" as a result
of its medical liability environment. While the AMA considers a wide
variety of factors, the most important of these is the magnitude of patients
losing access to care.' 8 The largely indiscriminate nature of the system-
where anyone can file a lawsuit for any reason regardless of whether there
is evidence that negligence occurred-has engendered a fear of liability in
physicians that is harmful to individual patients and to the health care
system as a whole. Fear of liability influences both the specialties that
physicians pursue, as well as the ways in which they practice medicine.
Medical residents, for example, appear to be growing increasingly
concerned about liability issues.19 Sixty-two percent of medical residents
reported that liability issues were their top concern in 2003-surpassing
any other concern, and representing an enormous increase from 2001,
when only fifteen percent of residents said liability was a concern. 20 The
AMA is concerned that medical residents' growing concerns may cause
them to avoid choosing high-risk specialties or practicing in a crisis state.
These fears extend to our nation's medical students as well.
Approximately half of the respondents to a recent AMA survey indicated
that the current medical liability environment was a factor in their specialty
choice. 21 There are many reasons medical students and residents choose
their future specialty, but it is a troubling sign that our nation's vicious
litigation system may exacerbate a potential shortage of high-risk
specialists. In addition, thirty-nine percent said the medical liability
environment was a factor in their decisions about whether they would like
to complete residency training in a given state.22 Finally, sixty-one percent
of students reported that they are extremely concerned that the current
medical liability environment is decreasing physicians' ability to provide
quality medical care.23 These fears become no less salient once physicians
18. See Am Med. Ass'n, supra note 7. We use the term "magnitude" to indicate that we
consider not only the number of patients that are affected, but also the extent to which they
are affected.
19. Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15 (2004).
20. MERITr, HAWKINS & Assoc., SUMMARY REPORT: 2003 SURVEY OF FINAL YEAR MED.
RESIDENTS 5 (2003).
21. Div. OF MKT. RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, AM. MED. ASS'N, AMA SURVEY: MEDICAL STUDENTS'
OPINIONS OF THE CURRENT MEDICAL LIABILITY ENVIRONMENT 1 (Nov. 2003). Forty-eight
percent of students in their third or fourth year of medical school indicated that the liability
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start practicing. On the one hand, liability fears can discourage innovation
in medical practice: Fifty-nine percent of physicians believe that the fear of
liability discourages open discussion and thinking about ways to reduce
health care errors. 4 On the other hand, it can encourage the performance
of unnecessary and costly tests.25 This practice of "defensive medicine"
takes many forms, including ordering tests and performing procedures
that may not be clinically indicated; referring patients to emergency
departments, safety net hospitals, and academic health centers; declining
to take calls in the emergency department and declining elective referrals
from emergency departments and safety net clinics, especially for
uninsured patients. All of these forms of "defensive medicine" are driven
by liability concerns.26 Defensive medicine is one of the most difficult
components of the medical liability debate to quantify, but it is perhaps
one of the most costly-the costs of defensive medicine are estimated to be
between $70 billion and $126 billion per year. 7
The costs of the liability crisis affect the U.S. health care system in a
number of ways. Most disturbingly, as physicians' liability insurance
premiums increase dramatically, physicians restrict services, retire early, or
relocate to another geographic area where the liability system is more
stable. For example, forty-five percent of hospitals reported that the
professional liability crisis has resulted in the loss of physicians and/or
reduced coverage in emergency departments. 28 In turn, patients may be
forced to wait longer to see a specialist (such as to receive a mammogram)
or travel longer distances to receive care (such as when a pregnant woman
in a rural community loses her doctor); cases of resulting patient deaths
have been reported.29
24. HARRISINTERACTrIVE INC., COMMON GOOD, COMMON GOOD FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY:
THE IMPACT ON MEDICINE 65 (2002), http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/57.pdf.
25. Richard Anderson, Commentary, Billions for Defense: The Pervasive Nature of Defensive
Medicine, 159 ARCH. INTERNAL MED., 2399, 2399 (1999) ("Malpractice litigation is the
primary cause of defensive medicine.").
26. ROBERT BERENSON ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY CRISIS MEETS MARKETS:
STRESS IN UNEXPECTED PLACES (Ctr. for Studying Health System Change, Issue Brief No. 68,
Sept. 2003), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/605/?words=malpractice.
27. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL
LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 11 (2003).
28. AM. Hosp. ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE: A GROWING CRISIS: RESULTS OF
THE AHA SURVEY OF HOSPITALS ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY EXPERIENCE 2 (2003).
29. See Health Coalition on Liab. & Access, Who Is Being Hurt: Patient Profiles, at
http://www.hcla.org/who.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
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II. CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
Perhaps medical malpractice claims would be less problematic if such
claims were the result of real negligence on the part of physicians and
others in the medical community. Yet, the data indicate otherwise: One
study found that "a substantial majority of medical negligence claims filed
are not based on actual provider carelessness. '" 30 In fact, the study found
that negligence had occurred in only one-sixth of the filed claims3 and
that "in its initial filing stage the tort system is even more error-prone than
the medical care system. '' 2 Another study, conducted in 1996, found that
the only significant predictor of payment to medical liability plaintiffs in
the form of a jury verdict or a settlement was disability and not the
presence of an adverse event due to negligence.33 In other words, the
severity of a patient's disability determined the jury award, not the actions
of the physician.34 These data suggest that it is not physician negligence,
but the zealousness of personal injury attorneys, that is prompting the
medical liability crisis.
Some have offered alternative explanations for the crisis to avoid
criticism of plaintiffs and their attorneys, but these explanations do not
hold up under scrutiny. Some claim that physicians are victims of
insurance companies that made bad business decisions and are now trying
to recoup their losses.3 5 However, investment yields of medical liability
36insurers have been stable and positive since 1998. Moreover, a report by
30. PAUL C. WIELER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION & PATIENT COMPENSATION 140 (1993).
31. Id. at 139.
32. Id. at 140.
33. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1963 (1996).
34. Id. at 1965.
35. JACKSON WILLIAMS, PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BRIEFING BOOK:
CHALLENGING THE MISLEADING CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS' LOBBY 24 (2004),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/MedMalBriefingBookO8-09-04.pdf. Opponents of
medical liability reform often suggest that the insurance industry is to blame for
indiscriminately increasing physicians' premiums. See, e.g., Press Release, Ams. for Ins.
Reform, Insurers Continue To Price-Gouge Doctors Despite Dropping Medical Malpractice
Payouts (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.insurance-reform.org/pr/041012.html.
36. Those returns have ranged from 4.5%-5.4% and include income from interest,
dividends, and real estate income. See AM BEST, BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES -
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the U.S. General Accounting Office sheds light on the cause of recent
escalation in physicians' medical liability insurance premiums and found
that "[i]ncreased losses on claims are the primary contributor to higher
medical malpractice premium rates, 37 and " [i] nsurers are not charging and
profiting from excessively high premium rates."38 The facts simply do not
justify placing blame on the insurance industry for an out-of-control legal
system.
III. ENDING THE CRISIS
Numerous studies of the medical liability crisis in states that have
implemented reforms have revealed the value of such efforts. To begin,
reforms have been linked with an overall decrease in medical
expenditures: "[M]alpractice reforms that directly reduce provider liability
pressure lead to reductions of 5 to 9 percent in medical expenditures
without substantial effects on mortality or medical complications. 30 9
Importantly, reforms are also credited with reducing physicians'
premiums. For example, one study found that in states with direct reforms,
including caps on non-economic damages, premiums declined by 8.4%
within three years.40 According to another report, capping medical liability
awards reduced premiums for general surgeons by an average of thirteen
percent in the year following enactment of the reform and by an average
of thirty-four percent over the long term.4' Premiums for general
practitioners and obstetricians were affected similarly. 2
Comparative data provide support. If we consider similar major
metropolitan markets and the premiums charged to physicians, we observe
vast differences between states which limit non-economic damages,43 such
37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MED. MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 15 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03702.pdf.
38. Id. at 32.
39. DANIEL P. KESSLER & MARK B. MCCLELLAN, Do DOCTORS PRACTICE DEFENSIVE
MEDICINE? 2 (Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Analysis, Working Paper No. 5466, 1996),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5466.pdf.
40. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability
Reforms on Physicians'Perceptions of Medical Care, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 98 (1997).
41. Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167 (1990).
42. Id.
43. Twenty-two states currently have some type of a cap on non-economic damages, and
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as California, and states which do not provide such limits:
Table 1: Professional Liability Insurance:





Florida (Miami-Dade) 147,621 166,368 201,376 249,196
Illinois (Chicago) 78,880 88,928 102,640 139,696
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) 37,556 45,938 100,045 134,335
Ohio (Cleveland) 56,166 72,541 100,691 119,482
California (Los Angeles) 52,874 52,874 54,563 60,259
General Surgery
Florida (Miami-Dade) 110,068 124,046 174,268 226,542
Illinois (Chicago) 52,364 59,016 68,080 92,576
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) 33,684 35,793 82,157 108,038
Ohio (Cleveland) 39,676 51,274 70,948 84,056
California (Los Angeles) 32,507 32,507 36,740 45,421
Internal Medicine
Florida (Miami-Dade) 32,744 38,378 56,153 65,697
Illinois (Chicago) 19,604 22,060 26,404 35,756
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) 7,390 7,853 18,429 24,546
Ohio (Cleveland) 12,192 15,828 21,375 25,013
California (Los Angeles) 10,097 10,097 11,164 12,493
six states have a cap on total damages. For a full discussion and comparison of different
state laws, see AM. MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-Now! (2004), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/450/mlrnowjunel 12004.pdf.
44. While California has a "hard" damages cap, the other states do not. The October
issues of Medical Liability Monitor for the years 2000 through 2003 provide these manual
rates for professional liability insurance. Medical Liability Monitor, an independent Chicago-
based publication, completed comprehensive rate reports of insurers in all fifty states. This
table does not include all the rates reported for the geographic areas selected above, nor
the premiums paid by physicians in other areas of the country, which may be higher or
lower. These rates reflect the manual rates for one of the state's marketshare leaders. The
MLM notes that these rates do not reflect credits, surcharges, or other factors that may
reduce or increase the actual rates charged to physicians. The AMA alone is responsible for
the accuracy of the above information taken from the MLM and believes the rates listed
above are a reasonable benchmark to demonstrate professional liability insurance trends
for select specialties in certain geographic areas.
8
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The AMA supports California's reforms, as set forth in MICRA, as a
model for federal and state legislation: MICRA has successfully moderated
physicians' professional liability insurance premium increases, while
preserving patients' access to the courts.45 This is not to say MICRA is the
only legislative solution, but its efficacy is now time-tested.
With its $250,000 cap on non-economic damages (it does not limit
economic damages), joint and several liability reform, a sliding-scale
contingency fee schedule, and other reforms, MICRA has resulted in stable
and moderate increases in premiums in California: Between 1976 and
2002, premiums in California rose 235%, while premiums in the rest of the
United States rose 750%.46 According to Phil Hinderberger of Norcal
Mutual, a major California insurer, before MICRA was passed "California
physicians paid almost 25 percent of all medical liability premiums paid in
the [United States] at a time when they represented only about 10 percent
of all practicing physicians in the [United States]. Today, California
physicians pay about [ten] percent of all medical liability premiums paid in
the [United States] which represents a fair share."47 Because of MICRA,
premiums for specialists in Los Angeles are substantially less than for
specialists in metropolitan areas in states without reforms such as Florida,
Illinois, and Nevada.48 Moreover, in California, claims are settled in one-
49third less time than in states without caps on non-economic damages -
not only decreasing the cost of litigation, but also resulting in injured
patients being compensated far faster. An important element of MICRA's
success is that it has been upheld by the California State Supreme Court. °
Other states have not been so lucky. Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, and
Washington have had reforms overturned by the courts, 1 while the state
45. AMA policy is decided by its House of Delegates, which has determined that
MICRA-type reforms should be the basis for federal legislative support. AMA policy also
supports a state's right to determine whether other types of medical liability reforms may be
more appropriate for that state.
46. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE, 1976-2002, at 116-17
(2002).
47. Posting of Phil Hinderberger, phil-hinderberger@norcalmutual.org, to asmac-
l@unity.ama-assn.org (Jan. 20, 2003) (copy on file with author).
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying table.
49. Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 88 (2002) (statement
of Richard E. Anderson, Chairman of the Doctors' Co. for the Physician Ins. Ass'n of Am.).
50. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v. Permanente Med.
Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
51. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E. 2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of
9
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constitutions in Arizona, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania prohibit caps on non-
economic damages.
52
Another important element of MICRA compared to other states that
have enacted a cap is the quality of the cap. For example, a state with a
"hard" cap on non-economic damages should not be compared to a state
with a "soft" cap on non-economic damages. A hard cap, like the $250,000
cap found in California's MICRA is not subject to exceptions, does not
adjust over time, and applies irrespective of the number of defendants or
plaintiffs. By contrast, a soft cap may be subject to numerous exceptions;
increase annually with inflation, other economic indicators, or based on a
set schedule; or apply individually to every defendant or plaintiff, thereby
allowing several caps for a single claim. Missouri illustrates the problems
presented by soft caps: The cap in Missouri increases with
inflation. Originally set at $350,000 in 1986, the cap reached $565,000 as
of February 1, 2004. 3 Missouri's cap was also considerably weakened by the
courts in a 2002 decision, Scott v. SSM Healthcare, in which the court held
that the cap can be applied separately for each act of medical
liability.54 Therefore, if there are two separate and distinct "occurrences"
of liability that contribute to a single injury the court can apply a separate
cap for each occurrence even if they are applied to a single defendant.
Where there are exceptions to the caps, there is not the same predictability
afforded to physicians and insurers under MICRA.
Indeed, while the need for reform is clear, achieving it has not been as
easy as one might hope. Florida has only been able to pass untested
reforms, including a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages that is
subject to broad exceptions which will certainly be the subject of judicial
interpretation for years to come.5 In Iowa and Missouri, after bitter debate,
the legislatures finally passed reforms,56 including hard caps on non-
economic damages, but the governors vetoed them.57 State legislatures in
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E. 2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987
P.2d 463 (Or. 1999); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
52. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 31; Ky. CONST. § 54; PA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
53. Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2004).
54. Scott v. SSM Healthcare, 70 S.W.3d 560, 569, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); see also Cook
v. Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
55. FLA. STAT. ch. 766.118 (2004).
56. H.F. 2440, 80th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2004); H.B. 1304, 92d Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004).
57. See Iowa Med. Soc'y, Governor Vetoes Tort Reform Bill, IMS ADVOCATE, May 21, 2004, at
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Pennsylvania;5 Massachusetts, 59 North Carolina, Virginia," Connecticut, 2
and Washington 63to name a few-were unable to enact proven reforms
in 2004.
MICRA-type legislation has also been pursued on the federal level.
However, the battles in Congress have largely mirrored those of the states
and have been characterized by intense partisanship. Multiple acts have
passed in the Republican-dominated House of Representatives, but have
repeatedly stalled in the Senate.6
Despite the obvious challenges, there -have been some signs of
promising change: Patients and policy makers worked together in Texas in
65late 2003 to enact reforms that have lowered liability insurance premiums.
In September 2003, Texas voters cemented the reforms with enactment of
Proposition 12, a "constitutional amendment concerning civil lawsuits
against doctors and health care providers, and other actions, authorizing
the legislature to determine limitations on non-economic damages."
66
Reforms recently enacted in West Virginia and Mississippi have potential,
but their future will not truly be known until the laws pass likely
58. Tanya Albert, Pennsylvania Physicians' Efforts on Liability Reform Hit a Roadblock: In
Wyoming, Legislators Discuss Tort Reform in a July Special Session, AMNEWs, July 26, 2004, at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/07/26/gvsb0726.htm.
59. Tom Walsh, Lawmakers Pass Limited Medical Liability Bill, MMS Vows To Continue
Push for More Adequate Reform (July 28, 2004), at http://www.massmed.org/
vitalsigns/aug04/topl .html.
60. Dan Kane, Special Interests Get Their Way: The 2004 Legislative Session, Set to End Today,
Shows that Well-Financed Interests Get Legislators' Attention, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
July 18, 2004, at Al.
61. Virginia S.B. 601 did not include a cap on non-economic damages, leading the
Medical Society of Virginia to make passing a cap on of its top priorities for 2005. Med.
Soc'y of Va., MSV's 2005 Legislative Agenda, at http://www.msv.org/public/articles/
index.cfm?cat=225).
62. Conn. State Med. Soc'y, Important Update on Medical Liability Insurance Reform:
Governor Vetoes HB 5669 (May 11, 2004), at http://csms.org/content/
showpage.asp?page=lu6.
63. Carol M. Ostrom, Initiative Would Seek Malpractice-Suit Caps, SEAarLE TIMES, June 15,
2004, at B2.
64. See supra note 9.
65. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. § 74.301 (2004); SenatorJohn Cornyn, Address to Senate on
One-Year Anniversary of Prop. 12 Passage (Sept. 13, 2004), http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/
record.cfm?id=226028&ref=home.
66. Tex. Sec'y of State, Proposed Constitutional Amendments (Sept. 13, 2003),
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/2003sepconsamend.shtml.
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constitutional challenges.
Several states have enacted a number of reforms over the years that
may be viable enhancements to MICRA-type reforms, such as pre-trial
screening panels, arbitration, mediation, alternative dispute resolution,
binding arbitration, and private judging. An alternative judicial system for
medical liability cases has also been studied. While these reforms do not
diminish the need for MICRA reforms at the state and federal level, if
properly structured in collaboration with MICRA, they may further help
curb skyrocketing medical liability premiums. Realistically these reforms
could only be implemented at the state level and should be initiated as
target pilot projects in select states to determine their efficacy.
CONCLUSION
We are all frustrated by the inability of policy makers to enact proven
reforms. Physicians are frustrated because they are being forced to give up
providing care for their patients due to the excesses of the legal system and
liability insurance costs. 8 Patients are frustrated because they are losing
access to care, frustrated when they are forced to find a new doctor,
frustrated when they are forced to drive longer distances, and frustrated
when they incur additional costs. Patients also are keenly aware of the
impact of lawsuits on health care costs: Over seventy percent agree that
medical liability litigation is driving up health care costs69 and favor a law
that would guarantee full payment for lost wages and medical expenses,
but would limit non-economic damages.7 °
That the system is out of balance is more than evident to anyone
willing to look. Without action based on proven reforms and demonstrable
data, the crisis will continue to spread. There are available solutions, but
67. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2004); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2004). The AMA will
closely watch the experience of West Virginia following its reforms because while the state
has a base cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages-with certain exceptions that could
increase the cap to $500,000 depending on the severity of the injury-the law also provides
for annual adjustments up to $375,000 (and $750,000 depending on the injury severity).
68. Div. OF MKT. RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, AM. MED. ASS'N, NATIONAL PHYSICIAN SURVEY ON
PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL LIABILITY 3 (Apr. 2003).
69. HEALTH COALITION ON LIAB. & ACCESS, THE MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: A FEDERAL
PROBLEM THAT REQUIRES A FEDERAL SOLUTION (2003), http://www.hcla.org/factsheets/2003-
221-federalissue.pdf.
70. Press Release, Health Coalition on Liab. & Access, Americans Say Health Care
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they will require policy makers willing to stand up for patients and change
the status quo in the crisis states. California's MICRA provides a prime
example of the type of reforms that are necessary if we are to fix the
medical liability crisis that currently pervades the United States health care
system. We must be relentless in our quest to fix our broken system. Failure
to do so will cause irreparable harm not only to physicians, but also to the
patients who depend on their care.
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